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RECENT BOOKS 
ATOMS AND THE LAW. By E. Blythe Stason, Samuel D. Estep and lf'illiam 
]. Pierce. [Parts I and II* Pp. 1-846] Ann Arbor: The University of Mich-
igan Law School, 1959. Pp. xx.vii, 1512. $15.00. 
In this monumental volume Dean Stason and his colleagues at The 
University of Michigan Law School, Professors Estep and Pierce, have 
carried to completion a task of enormous scope. They have done nothing 
less than survey in detail all of the legal problems that will be raised by 
the peacetime exploitation of atomic energy. To do so they have had 
to look into the future and to risk prophecy of the shape and scope of 
the problems which are yet to come; their performance must constitute the 
most steadfast, thorough, and fully-documented gazing into the crystal ball 
in history. The magnitude of their achievement is such as to defy the limita-
tions of a book review; and this is true although this review will be con-
cerned only with Parts I and II, which deal with tort issues and which occupy 
the first 846 of the book's 1512 pages.1 I shall therefore at the outset abandon 
all hope of doing justice to the richness of the book's materials; rather I 
shall confine discussion to a series of general points which the nature of the 
task and the authors' treatment of it suggest. 
The basic task - the holding up of contemporary tort law to the mirror 
of this awesome new source2 of accidents - strikes me as profoundly ex-
citing and worthwhile. It provides a historic occasion for reconsideration 
of the wisdom and completeness of the law, a chance for a grand overview of 
what it is that tort law does and for a large criticism of it as it interacts with 
the pressing new problems generated by the use of atomic energy. It is 
almost as though we were placed once again at the threshold of the Indus-
trial Revolution and invited to consider the problems with which our 
society and our law would soon be confronted. Reading the book is thus 
an extraordinary experience and privilege for the torts teacher. 
The book is not easy to appraise as a work of scholarship. Necessarily 
much of the scholarship is derivative in the sense of collating an existing 
body of law with a new set of problems. Tort law had needed in recent years 
the monograph on the specific problem such as Dickerson's book on prod-
ucts liability in the food industry.3 It might be thought that Atoms and the 
Law is the parallel monograph on the specific problem of atomic energy. 
• Parts III, IV and V were reviewed by David F. Cavers in 58 MICH. L. R.Ev. at p. 949, 
April 1960.-Ed. 
1 The book has five major parts. The other three deal with "State Regulation of 
Atomic Energy," "Federal Regulatory and Administrative Limitations Upon Atomic Ac-
tivities" and "International Control of Atomic Energy." See Cavers, Book Review, 58 MICH. 
L. R.Ev. 949 (1960). 
2 As we subsequently note in the text, there is some doubt, in view of the e.xcellent 
safety record thus far, as to just how "awesome" these possibilities are. 
3 DIC!IBRSON1 PRODUCI'S LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER (1951). 
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However, the uses of atomic energy are so varied and its probable versatility 
in causing harm is so great that a study of this specific problem is tanta-
mount to a study of virtually all tort problems. Further, at several points 
the authors have done original legal research in considerable depth. Hence 
almost as a by-product of their basic purpose they have produced another 
general torts text which has claim to a place on the shelf alongside the 
Restatement, Prosser, and Harper and James. 
Beyond this is the remarkable factual imagination the authors have dis-
played in locating the new problems. On this level the book is stunning 
indeed. They have been inexhaustibly thorough in imagining what kinds 
of problems ·will arise and in so doing they have furnished us with a major 
example of the kind of seasoned experienced judgment the lawyer can 
provide in planning ahead for the future. Hence, although the book is 
uneven, much of it rates as original scholarship. 
Thus the task is exciting, the imagination is high, and the scholarship 
is deep. But despite these clear virtues the work is full of difficulties which 
invite criticism. In the uncharitable tradition of book reviewing, I will 
devote most of the space to the difficulties. 
The very virtue of detailed and patient foresight proves to be a source 
of serious difficulty throughout for the allocation of discussion. There 
are two related problems here. First, whether the fact that the new source of 
accident is atomic energy will add any novelty to the legal issues; for ex-
ample in a serious radiation accident many people will be killed but this 
would hardly justify a detailed study of death statutes since however the 
person is killed the legal issues raised by a claim for wrongful death remain 
the same. The authors seem to have followed an uneven editorial policy 
with respect to this dilemma. Thus the chapter on workman's compensa-
tion is a concise summary of the familiar law and devotes most of its space 
to the new issues that will arise from radiation accidents. But often they 
seem to be rehashing much law which picks up no novelty from its appli-
cation to the atomic energy accident. An interesting instance of this is the 
handling of prenatal injuries to which some fifty pages are devoted. It 
is true that their legal analysis is very good and that radiation carries a 
new potential for causing prenatal harm, and further that prenatal tort 
law has developed only very recently, yet their lengthy discussion of the 
application of tort law to prenatal injuries caused by radiation does not read 
very differently from any of the several recent law review commentaries 
which have thoroughly reviewed the topic without the stimulus of the 
atomic energy accident. In contrast the novel issues of genetic injury from 
radiation receive little emphasis, although the authors do remind us that 
the law may someday have to resolve the puzzling issue of injury to a child 
who is not merely unborn but unconceived at the date of the wrong. 
The other wing of this difficulty is that they sometimes are running so 
far ahead of events that the new case has no shape or feel as yet. Conse-
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quently the application of existing law to the new case is not so much an 
application as a repetition of law. It is a little as though in anticipating 
the legal problems that will arise when man reaches the moon, a book 
on lunar law were to discuss at length the choice betlveen the Torrens 
system and the recording acts on the supposition that property rights on the 
moon will be created. The book is thus an excellent playground for exercises 
on the arresting jurisprudential issue of when an application of a general 
legal principle to a case serves to illumine the principle and when it serves 
merely to repeat the principle. It is tempting to say that the book is an 
instance of too much and too soon. 
A second pervasive difficulty stems from some uncertainty as to the 
audience for whom the book was written. Presumably the authors did not 
intend to write another torts text as their main objective. Nor did they 
apparently intend a critical essay on the policy issues involved, although 
the book is again uneven in its explicit criticism of existing law. They 
seem to have decided upon a book for the practising lawyer, a book the 
lawyer must have on his desk while he waits for the first nuclear accident 
to occur. The text is full of references to the "nuclear lawyer" and "the 
lawyer in the atomic age." This seems to me an instance of what might be 
called the "practical fallacy." With such a topic, the authors should have 
had the courage of their imagination, and not have attempted to make their 
book palatable to the presumably hard-headed bar by the pretense that it 
was actually written for them. 
The desire to appear to be practical while engaged in pioneering legal 
study led the authors into what may well prove the most upsetting feature 
of their endeavor. They have approached their problem by a careful exam-
ination of the common law tort doctrine. It is a serious weakness that they 
do not face up early to the question whether the new problems are to be 
solved primarily by the judge or by the legislature. It is one thing to look 
to the common law doctrine for advice on legislation; it is quite another 
however literally to apply it inch by inch as the authors have done. Thus 
at page 685 they seem to me to give the game away in the following sen-
tence: "In view of this complicated and uncertain state of affairs of one 
thing we may be certain, namely, that before we move very many years 
into the atomic age, state legislatures will be taking action to provide 
statutory rules covering the matter of liability in radiation injuries .... " 
I do not mean to suggest that the first 685 pages of patient discussion are 
rendered worthless by this prediction of legislation. I do mean to suggest, 
however, that the likelihood of legislation plays havoc with their organ-
ization and with their basic approach. Although at many points they have 
made specific recommendations for changes in the law, they have been in-
hibited throughout by the effort to extend the common law to the atomic 
accident and have not freely assessed the alternatives a legislature would 
have. Had they faced up at the outset to the probability of legislation they 
could not of course have written a book for the bar since it would be 
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hazardous indeed to attempt to predict what statutes the future will bring 
and to then attempt to apply them. 
It is perhaps these same factors that have led to the most striking feature 
of the book - the authors' preoccupation with negligence as the criterion of 
liability in the atomic age. One would have thought that the advent of the 
atomic accident would have provided a splendid occasion for redebating the 
wisdom of Brown v. Kendall. Or at least that it would have furnished a 
fine case for analysing the impact of common law strict liability notions, 
particularly those for ultrahazardous activity under section 519 of the 
Restatement. It has always been a puzzle how section 519 could share the 
tort world peaceably with the negligence principle; and atomic energy would 
have seemed a superb test case. The book, however, plods through the neg-
ligence rules first and really never debates seriously what the proper cri-
terion of liability should be.4 It is true that on page 635 the authors finally 
discuss strict liability and good old Rylands v. Fletcher, but their heart 
does not seem to be in it. Their treatment is the more curious because at 
this point they pause for a useful review of the history of all the atomic acci-
dents that have thus far occurred and add some good hypothetical cases 
of their own. They then attempt to decide whether negligence or strict 
liability will control. By my count they put 23 cases in all; in 14 they con-
clude it will be strict liability; in 6 they say that "available case law is not 
clear" and in 3 they lean toward negligence. Yet this box score seems to have 
had little impact on the emphasis throughout the rest of the book. 
The history of atomic accidents suggests one other fascinating possibility. 
The remarkable thing is that there have been so few accidents of any sort. 
We are told that the AEC has operated 25 reactors for over 600,000 hours 
using almost 18,000,000 man hours without accident. Clearly the crude 
popular impression that tort law will have to face disasters comparable to 
Hiroshima is happily wide of the mark. In fact it is doubtful that on the 
current safety record the use of atomic energy would qualify as ultra-
hazardous under section 5191 One is tempted to go on and suggest, with 
tongue in cheek, that perhaps atomic energy will not produce any tort 
problems and that the authors have been engaged in documenting with 
exquisite care the legal consequences of a private nightmare. 
As subchapter C of the long third chapter on Negligence the authors 
report in detail on the government insurance indemnity program for atomic 
energy. Apparently the threat of tort liability has been considered so great 
and so far in excess of private insurance funds that the government has had 
to step in and undenvrite $500,000,000 of liability insurance for each in-
dustrial user of atomic energy over and beyond his private coverage. We 
have here an instructive instance of the deterrent impact tort liability may 
have on industry. Thus there may be something after all to the fashionable 
interpretation of Brown v. Kendall as a subsidy to infant New England 
4 There is, however, some discussion of the issue in Chapter IV, especially p. 721 et seq. 
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industry. This time, however, the subsidy is not buried in the negligence 
limitation but is perfectly visible in the government insurance program 
which presumably rests in the end on general tax revenues. 
But what seems extraordinary to me is that this dramatic use of govern-
ment insurance has so little impact on the authors' discussion of liability 
criteria. It is true that the Anderson amendment to the Atomic Energy Act 
carefully refrained from tampering with state substantive law,5 and it is 
perhaps on this ground the authors decided to discuss liability without 
reference to the implications of this insurance arrangement. This seems to 
have been unwise since this massive governmental undenvriting of liability 
by the entire society which wishes to have atomic energy exploited for peace-
ful uses is surely an epochal novelty in tort law. It is difficult to see why 
this government insurance scheme does not make very persuasive the case 
for "an atomic accident compensation plan." Indeed one of the great 
ironies of recent writing on tort law is evident when we compare A toms 
and the Law to Leon Green's Traffic Victims.6 Green, writing about the 
auto accidents we have today, argues for junking the negligence system and 
utilizing the insurance principle so as to make feasible a compensation plan. 
Dean Stason and his colleagues writing about the atomic accident of to-
morrow eschew the insurance that is already there and instead support a 
meticulous use of the negligence principle. Perhaps the moral is that in 
writing about tort policy we all tend to come out through the same door 
we enter.7 
The discussion thus far has been unfair to the genuine novelty of much 
of the book and has given an erroneous impression of the degree to which 
it centers on the discussion of a liability, keyed to negligence. Actually of 
the 850 pages of tort discussion, some 200 are allotted to the insurance pro-
visions, to strict liability and to workmen's compensation. And, more im-
portant, another 325 are devoted to issues of damages and causation where 
the book makes its most interesting and refreshing contributions. The 
authors make it clear that the atomic accident will make salient such cur-
rently esoteric damage issues as prenatal injuries, genetic injuries, shortened 
life spans, cumulative injuries, and an interesting variety of psychic harms 
due to fear of fall out, etc., and they have given us a fine text on these 
matters. 
It is, however, with respect to causation that the exciting possibilities 
of the topic are most fully realized. Radiation accidents suggest splendid 
issues of multiple and gradual, cumulative causation. Moreover, as the 
5 See p. 574. The only change is that the amendment imposes a limit of $560 million 
on tort liability. 
6 GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958). 
7 I have reviewed the Green proposal in 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 679 (1959). I think I 
would disagree with both Dean Green and Dean Stason. I do not find the compensation 
plan formula persuasive in the auto accident case; however, I do find it persuasive for the 
atomic accident. 
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authors excellently analyse, the new accidents will test profoundly our loose 
notions about probabilities both of causation and of future harm. All torts 
teachers have at some time speculated ·with their classes about what the result 
should be if we knew exactly what the probabilities of causation were. If 
the plaintiff shows that it is 60% likely that the defendant caused the harm, 
should he recover 100%? and if he shows it was 45% likely, should he recover 
nothing? Apparently exposure to radiation is such as to yield strict statistical 
estimates of the likelihood of future harm from the exposure. As the authors 
ably argue we must revise our thinking about causation if we are to deal 
with the radiation accident. They document carefully how odd and how 
wrong the results under current law will be here. Assume that under nor-
mal circumstances one person in 1000 will get leukemia and that after ex-
posure to a certain quantum of radiation, 7 persons in 1000 will get leu-
kemia. If then there is a tortious exposure to radiation, how should the 
damage issues be handled? If we wait until the 7 cases develop, each victim 
will be able to show that it was more likely than not that his sickness was 
caused by his exposure and would hence recover 100% under current law. 
However the leukemia may not develop for years after the exposure and the 
authors argue that the law should not wait. If, however, they sue promptly, 
the odds are only 7 in 1000 that the particular plaintiff will develop the sick-
ness. At this point the authors suggest an ingenious contingent injury fund. 
Each plaintiff will get a contingent claim against the fund and each de-
fendant will pay into the fund only the percentage of harm he may have 
caused. If the odds have been estimated properly the fund over time will 
have enough money to compensate the victims who actually do get leukemia. 
The authors have admirably broken with conventional thinking about 
causation and proof of future harm and their analysis is certain to enliven 
class discussions of causation for many years to come.8 
Even here one is disturbed by the authors' failure to react to the im-
plications of the government insurance coverage. Three points are involved. 
First, there is the issue of multiple defendants where causation in fact is as 
obscure as in the well known Summers v. Tice. The authors make the very 
bright point that if both defendants are insured by the same company we 
do not really have to solve the issue of which one caused the harm to do 
justice, since either way the loss will fall on the same fund. This does not 
keep them, however, from a very full analysis of multiple defendant cases 
although as they note, in the end, the atomic accident will be borne by the 
government insurance fund.9 Second, they are impressed with the fairness 
of their contingent injury fund discount scheme to defendants who under it 
need never pay for more than the harm they have contingently caused. How-
8 Their fund could extend also to the contingent claim where the odds are less than 
50-50 that radiation caused the harm so long as radiation increased the chance of harm 
by some definite amount. See p. 515. See Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The 
Need for a New Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REv. 259 (1960). 
o Pp. 417-418. 
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ever, since all defendants will have to be insured it is likely that premiums will 
be level and will make the neat discriminations in their scheme unnecessary. 
The real costs of insurance coverage will be determined by the harms that 
actually do occur and not by the contingent chance of their occurring. 
Third, there is the problem in the above leukemia example of the recovery 
by the seventh victim since only six new victims were created by the ex-
posure. Here the authors suggest that all ultimate victims recover only 6/7 
of their loss since there is no way of identifying which one does not deserve 
to recover.10 Within their framework this is a sensible solution. However 
the shadow of the mighty government insurance underwriting suggests the 
daring possibility that the government fund be regarded not as indemnity 
insurance but as accident insurance. If so, all concern with the incidence 
of liability becomes irrelevant and a way is suggested for allowing even the 
seventh victim full recovery. This is not the place to develop the point, but 
arguably the impact of the tax supported government fund is such that 
like English Social Insurance it might make tort law obsolete11 by pooling 
the humanly caused accidents, which have been the preoccupation of tort 
law, with the other misfortunes man is heir to, into a general pervasive acci-
dent insurance program. Hence the debate might shift from the current 
one under auto compensation plans of why the auto victim and not the 
cancer victim to why the cancer victim of radiation and not all cancer victims. 
The effort to make the book practical rather than speculative has in 
the end cut it off from some of the excitement inherent in the topic. Peace-
ful utilization of atomic energy will bring us a brave new world indeed but 
as the authors lead us into that new world they do so with a stubborn 
nineteenth century perspective. Although on this particular topic I per-
sonally would have preferred more of the spice that Green, James or Ehrenz-
weig would have given to it, Dean Stason and his co-authors have done 
a major job of research, analysis, and exposition and the American law of 
torts is the richer for it. 
lOP. 527. 
Harry Kalven, Jr., 
Professor of Law, 
University of Chicago 
11 Of coUISe the English did not actually abolish tort law but permitted some deduc• 
tion of the social insurance recovery from the tort damages. See Friedman, Social Insurance 
and the Principles of Tort Liability, 63 HAR.v. L. REv. 241 (1949). 
